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Abstract—In this paper, we consider the problem of blocking
malicious traffic on the Internet, via source-based filtering. In
particular, we consider filtering via access control lists (ACLs):
these are already available at the routers today but are a
scarce resource because they are stored in the expensive ternary
content addressable memory (TCAM). Aggregation (by filtering
source prefixes instead of individual IP addresses) helps reduce
the number of filters, but comes also at the cost of blocking
legitimate traffic originating from the filtered prefixes. We show
how to optimally choose which source prefixes to filter, for a
variety of realistic attack scenarios and operators’ policies. In
each scenario, we design optimal, yet computationally efficient,
algorithms. Using logs from Dshield.org, we evaluate the
algorithms and demonstrate that they bring significant benefit
in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
How can we protect our network infrastructure from ma-
licious traffic, such as scanning, malicious code propagation,
spam, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks? These
activities cause problems on a regular basis, ranging from
simple annoyance to severe financial, operational and political
damage to companies, organizations and critical infrastructure.
In recent years, they have increased in volume, sophistication,
and automation, largely enabled by botnets, which are used as
the platform for launching these attacks.
Protecting a victim (host or network) from malicious traffic
is a hard problem that requires the coordination of sev-
eral complementary components, including non-technical (e.g.,
business and legal) and technical solutions (at the application
and/or network level). Filtering support from the network is
a fundamental building block in this effort. For example, an
Internet service provider (ISP) may use filtering in response
to an ongoing DDoS attack, to block the DDoS traffic before
it reaches its clients. Another ISP may want to proactively
identify and block traffic carrying malicious code before it
reaches and compromises vulnerable hosts in the first place.
In either case, filtering is a necessary operation that must be
performed within the network.
Filtering capabilities are already available at routers today
via access control lists (ACLs). ACLs enable a router to match
a packet header against pre-defined rules and take pre-defined
actions on the matching packets [1], and they are currently
used for enforcing a variety of policies, including infrastruc-
ture protection [2]. For the purpose of blocking malicious
traffic, a filter is a simple ACL rule that denies access to
a source IP address or prefix. To keep up with the high
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forwarding rates of modern routers, filtering is implemented
in hardware: ACLs are typically stored in ternary content
addressable memory (TCAM), which allows for parallel access
and reduces the number of lookups per forwarded packet.
However, TCAM is more expensive and consumes more space
and power than conventional memory. The size and cost of
TCAM puts a limit on the number of filters, and this is not
expected to change in the near future.1 With thousands or tens
of thousands of filters per path, an ISP alone cannot hope to
block the currently witnessed attacks, not to mention attacks
from multimillion-node botnets expected in the near future.
Consider the example shown in Fig.1(a): an attacker com-
mands a large number of compromised hosts to send traffic to
a victim V (say a webserver), thus exhausting the resources
of V and preventing it from serving its legitimate clients. The
ISP of V tries to protect its client by blocking the attack at
the gateway router G. Ideally, G should install one separate
filter to block traffic from each attack source. However, there
are typically fewer filters than attack sources, hence aggre-
gation is used, i.e., a single filter (ACL) is used to block an
entire source address prefix. This has the desired effect of
reducing the number of filters necessary to block all attack
traffic, but also the undesired effect of blocking legitimate
traffic originating from the blocked prefixes (we will call the
damage that results from blocking legitimate traffic “collateral
damage”). Therefore, filter selection can be viewed as an
optimization problem that tries to block as many attack sources
with as little collateral damage as possible, given a limited
number of filters. Furthermore, several measurement studies
have demonstrated that malicious sources exhibit temporal and
spatial clustering [3]–[9], a feature that can be exploited by
prefix-based filtering.
In this paper, we formulate a general framework for studying
source prefix filtering as a resource allocation problem. To the
best of our knowledge, optimal filter selection has not been
explored so far, as most related work on filtering has focused
on protocol and architectural aspects. Within this framework,
we formulate and solve five practical source-address filtering
problems, depending on the attack scenario and the operator’s
policy and constraints. Our contributions are twofold. On the
theoretical side, filter selection optimization leads to novel
variations of the multidimensional knapsack problem. We ex-
ploit the special structure of each problem, and design optimal
1 A router linecard or supervisor-engine card typically supports a single
TCAM chip with tens of thousands of entries. For example, the Cisco Catalyst
4500, a mid-range switch, provides a 64,000-entry TCAM to be shared among
all its interfaces (48- 384). Cisco 12000, a high-end router used at the Internet
core, provides 20,000 entries that operate at line-speed per linecard (up to
4 Gigabit Ethernet interfaces). The Catalyst 6500 switch can fit 16K-32K
patterns and 2K-4K masks in the TCAM. Depending on how an ISP connects
to its clients, each individual client can typically use only part of these ACLs,
i.e., a few hundreds to a few thousands filters.
2Malicious HostGood Host
LAN
ISPs
Enterprise
V
21
GatewayG
A B
(a) Actual network.
Malicious IPGood IP
IP Prefix Filter
A
a.b.*
a.b.c.*
a.b.c.10*
a.b.c.10111010
F2
F1
B
(b) Hierarchy of source IP addresses and prefixes
Fig. 1. Example of a distributed attack. Let’s assume that the gateway router G has only two filters, F1 and F2, available to block malicious traffic and
protect the victim V . It uses F1 to block a single malicious source address (A) and F2 to block the entire source prefix a.b.c.∗, which contains 3 malicious
sources but also one legitimate source (B). Therefore, the selection of filter F2 trades-off collateral damage (blocking B) for reduction in the number of filters
(from 3 to 1). We note that both filters, F1 and F2, are ACLs installed at the same router G.
and computationally efficient algorithms. On the practical side,
we provide a set of cost-efficient algorithms that can be used
both by operators to block undesired traffic and by router
manufacturers to optimize the use of TCAM and eventually
the cost of routers. We used logs from Dshield.org to
demonstrate that optimally selecting which source prefixes to
filter brings significant benefits compared to non-optimized
filtering or to generic clustering algorithms.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section
II, we formulate the general framework for optimal source
prefix filtering. In Section III, we study five specific problems
that correspond to different attack scenarios and operator
policies: blocking all addresses in a blacklist (BLOCK-ALL);
blocking some addresses in a blacklist (BLOCK-SOME);
blocking all/some addresses in a time-varying blacklist (TIME-
VARYING BLOCK-ALL/SOME); blocking flows during a
DDoS flooding attack to meet bandwidth constraints (FLOOD-
ING); and distributed filtering across several routers during
flooding (DIST-FLOODING). For each problem, we design
an optimal, yet computationally efficient, algorithm to solve
it. In Section IV, we use data from Dshield.org [10]
to evaluate the performance of our algorithms in realistic
attack scenarios and we demonstrate that they bring significant
benefit in practice. Section V discusses related work and puts
our work in perspective. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND FRAMEWORK
A. Terminology and Notation
Table I summarizes our terminology and notation.
Source IP Addresses and Prefixes: Every IPv4 address ip
is a 32-bit sequence. We use standard IP/mask notation, i.e.,
we write p/l to indicate a prefix p of length l bits, where p
and l can take values l = 0, 1, ..., 32 and p = 0, 1, ..., 2l − 1,
respectively. For brevity, when the meaning is obvious from
the context, we simply write p to indicate prefix p/l. We
write ip ∈ p/l to indicate that address ip is within the 232−l
addresses covered by prefix p/l.
Blacklists and Whitelists: A blacklist (BL) is a set of unique
source IP addresses that send bad (undesired) traffic to the
victim. Similarly, a whitelist (WL) is a set of unique source
IP addresses that send good (legitimate) traffic to the victim.
An address may belong either to a blacklist (in which case
we call it a “bad” address) or a to whitelist (in which case
we call it a “good” address), but not to both. We use |BL|
and |WL| to indicate the number of addresses in BL and
WL, respectively. For brevity, we also use N = |BL| for the
number of addresses in the blacklist, which is the size of the
most important input to our problem.
Each address ip in a blacklist or a whitelist is assigned
a weight wip, indicating the importance of that address. If
ip is a bad address, we assign it a negative weight wip ≤
0, which indicates the benefit from blocking ip; if ip is a
good address, we assign it a positive weight wip ≥ 0, which
indicates the damage from blocking ip. The higher the absolute
value of the weight, the higher the benefit or damage and thus
the preference to block the address or not
The weight wip can have a different interpretation depend-
ing on the filtering problem. For instance, it can represent the
amount of bad/good traffic originating from the corresponding
source address, or it can express policy: depending on the
amount of money gained/lost by the ISP when blocking source
address ip, an ISP operator can assign large positive weights
to its important customers that should never be blocked, or
large negative weights to the worst attack sources that must
definitely be blocked.
Creating blacklists and whitelists (i.e., identifying bad and
good addresses and assigning appropriate weights to them) is
a difficult problem on its own right, but orthogonal to this
work. We assume that the blacklist BL is provided by another
module (e.g., an intrusion detection system or historical data)
as input to our problem. The sources of legitimate traffic are
also assumed known: e.g., web servers or ISPs typically keep
historical data and know their customers. If it is not explicitly
given, we take a conservative approach and define the whitelist
WL to include all addresses that are not in BL.
Filters: We focus on filtering of source address prefixes. In
our context, a filter is an ACL rule that specifies that all packets
with a source IP address in prefix p/l should be blocked. Fmax
is the maximum number of available filters, and it is given as
input to our problem. Filter optimization is meaningful only
when Fmax is much smaller than the size of the blacklist N =
|BL|; otherwise the optimal would be to block every single
3ip Generic IP address
wip Weight assigned to address ip
BL Blacklist: a list of bad addresses
N = |BL| Number of unique addresses in BL
WL Whitelist: a set of “good” addresses
p/l (or “p” for short) Prefix p of length l bits (IP/mask notation)
ip ∈ p/l IP address that belongs to prefix p/l
xp/l ∈ {1, 0} Indicates if a filter blocks prefix p/l or not
gp/l =
∑
ip∈p/l∩WL wip Collateral damage from filtering prefix p/l
bp/l = |
∑
ip∈p/l∩BLwip| Bad traffic blocked by filtering prefix p/l
Fmax (<< N) Maximum number of available filters
zp(F ) Value of the optimal solution of subproblem
considering only addresses in prefix p
and up to F filters
Xp(F ) Set of filters used in optimal solution zp(F )
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATION AND TERMINOLOGY
bad address. Fmax << N is indeed the case in practice due
to the size and cost of the TCAM, as mentioned in Section I.
The decision variable xp/l ∈ {1, 0} is 1 if a filter
is assigned to block prefix p/l; or 0 otherwise. A fil-
ter p/l blocks all 232−l addresses in that range. Hence,
bp/l = |
∑
ip∈p/l∩BL wip| expresses the benefit from filter
p/l, whereas gp/l =
∑
ip∈p/l∩WL wip expresses the collateral
damage it causes. An effective filter should have a large benefit
bp/l and low collateral damage gp/l.
Collateral Damage and Benefit: We define the collateral
damage of a filtering solution as
∑
p/l
∑
ip∈p/l∩WL wip ·
xp/l, i.e., the sum of the weights of the good addresses
whose traffic is blocked. We define the filtering benefit as∑
p/l
∑
ip∈p/l∩BL wip · xp/l, i.e., the sum of the weights of
the bad addresses whose traffic is blocked.
B. Rationale and Overview of Filtering Problems
Given a set of bad and a set of good source addresses
(BL and WL), a measure of their importance (the address
weights w), and a resource budget (Fmax plus, possibly, other
resources, depending on the particular problem), the goal is
to select which source prefixes to filter so as to minimize the
impact of bad traffic and can be accommodated with the given
resource budget. Different variations of the problem can be
formulated, depending on the attack scenario and the victim
network’s policies and constraints: the network operator may
want to block all bad addresses or tolerate to leave some
unblocked; the attack may be of low rate or a flooding attack;
filters may be installed at one or several routers.
At the core of each filtering problem lies the following
optimization problem:
min
∑
p/l
∑
ip∈p/l
wipxp/l (1)
s.t.
∑
p/l
xp/l ≤ Fmax (2)
∑
p/l:ip∈p/l
xp/l ≤ 1 ∀ip ∈ BL (3)
xp/l ∈ {0, 1} ∀l = 0, ..., 32, p = 0, ..., 2
l (4)
Eq. (1) expresses the objective to minimize the total cost of
bad traffic, which consists of two parts: the collateral damage
(the terms with wip > 0) and the cost of leaving bad traffic
unblocked (the terms with wip < 0). We use notation
∑
p/l to
denote summation over all possible prefixes p/l: l = 0, ..., 32,
p = 0, ..., 2l − 1. Eq. (2) expresses the constraint on the
number of filters. Eq. (3) states that overlapping filters are
mutually exclusive, i.e., each bad address can be blocked at
most once, otherwise filtering resources are wasted. Eq. (4)
lists the decision variables xp/l corresponding to all possible
prefixes, and will be omitted from now on for brevity.
Eq. (1)–(4) provide the general framework for filter-
selection optimization. Different filtering problems can be
written as special cases, possibly with additional constraints.
As we discuss in Section V, these are all multi-dimensional
knapsack problems [11], which are, in general, NP-hard. The
specifics of each problem affect dramatically the complexity,
which can vary from linear to NP-hard.
In this paper, we formulate five practical filtering problems
and develop optimal, yet computationally efficient algorithms
to solve them. Here, we summarize the rationale behind each
problem and we outline our main results; the exact formulation
and detailed solution is provided in Section III.
BLOCK-ALL: Suppose a network operator has a blacklist
BL of size N , a whitelist WL, and a weight assigned to each
address that indicates the amount of traffic originating from
that address. The total number of available filters is Fmax. The
first practical goal the operator may have is to install a set of
filters that block all bad traffic so as to minimize the amount
of good traffic that is blocked. We design an optimal algorithm
that solves this problem at the lowest achievable complexity
(linearly increasing with N ).
BLOCK-SOME: A blacklist and a whitelist are given, as
before, but the operator is now willing to block only some,
instead of all, bad traffic, so as to decrease the amount of
good traffic blocked at the expense of leaving some bad traffic
unblocked. The goal now is to block only those prefixes
that have the highest impact and do not contain sources that
generate a lot of traffic, so as to minimize the total cost in
Eq. (1). We design an optimal, lowest-complexity (linearly
increasing with N ) algorithm for this problem, as well.
TIME-VARYING BLOCK-ALL (SOME): Bad addresses
may change over time [4]: new sources may send malicious
traffic and conversely, previously active sources may disappear
(e.g., when their vulnerabilities are patched). One way to
solve the dynamic versions of BLOCK-ALL (SOME) is to
run the algorithms we propose for the static versions for the
blacklist/whitelist pair at each time slot. However, given that
subsequent blacklists typically exhibit significant overlap [4],
it may be more efficient to exploit this temporal correlation
and incrementally update the filtering rules. We show that is it
possible to update the optimal solution, as new IPs are inserted
in or removed from the blacklist, in logN time.
FLOODING: In a flooding attack, such as the one shown
in Fig. 1, a large number of compromised hosts send traffic to
the victim and exhaust the victim’s access bandwidth. In this
case, our framework can be used to select the filtering rules
that minimize the amount of good traffic that is blocked while
meeting the access bandwidth constraint – in particular, the
total bandwidth consumed by the unblocked traffic should not
4exceed the bandwidth of the flooded link, e.g., link G-V in
Fig. 1. We prove that this problem is NP-hard and we design
a pseudo-polynomial algorithm that solves it optimally, with
complexity that grows linearly with the blacklist and whitelist
size, i.e., |BL|+ |WL|.
DIST-FLOODING: All the above problems aim at in-
stalling filters at a single router. However, a network operator
may use the filtering resources collaboratively across several
routers to better defend against an attack. Distributed filtering
may also be enabled by the cooperation across several ISPs
against a common enemy. The question in both cases is not
only which prefixes to block, but also at which router to
install the filters. We study the practical problem of distributed
filtering against a flooding attack. We prove that the problem
can be decomposed into several FLOODING problems, which
can be solved in a distributed way.
III. FILTERING PROBLEMS AND ALGORITHMS
In this section, we provide the detailed formulation of each
problem and we present the algorithm that solves it. We start
by defining the data structure that we use to represent the
problem and to develop our algorithms.
A. A Data Structure for Representing Filtering Solutions
Definition 1 (LCP Tree): Given a set of addresses A, we
define the Longest Common Prefix tree of A, denoted by LCP-
tree(A), as the binary tree with the following properties: (i)
each leaf represents a different address in A and there is a leaf
for each address in A; (ii) each intermediate (non-leaf) node
represents the longest common prefix between the prefixes
represented by its two children.
The LCP-tree(A) can be constructed from the complete
binary tree (with root leaves at level 32 corresponding to
all addresses [0, ...., 232 − 1], and intermediate nodes at level
i = 1, ..32 corresponding to all prefixes of length i) by
removing the branches that do not have addresses in A, and
then by removing nodes with a single child. It is a variation
of the binary (or unibit) trie [12], but does not have nodes
with a single child. The LCP-tree(A) offers an intuitive way
to represent sets of prefixes that can block the addresses in
set A: each node in the LCP tree represents a prefix that can
be blocked, hence we can represent a filtering solution as the
pruned version of the LCP tree, whose leaves are all and only
the blocked prefixes.
Example 1: For instance, consider the LCP tree depicted in
Figure 2, whose leaves correspond to bad addresses that we
want to block. One (expensive) solution is to use one filter to
block each bad address; thus the LCP tree is not pruned and
its leaves correspond to the filters. Another feasible solution
is to use three filters and block traffic from prefixes 0/1, 8/2,
and 12/4; this can be represented by the pruned version of the
LCP tree that includes the aforementioned prefixes as leaves.
Yet another (rather radical) solution is to filter a single prefix
(0/0) to block all traffic; this can be represented by the pruned
version of the LCP tree that includes only its root.
.
Fig. 2. Example of LCP-tree(BL). Consider a blacklist
consisting of the following 9 bad addresses: BL =
{10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.3, 10.0.0.4, 10.0.0.5, 10.0.0.7, 10.0.0.8, 10.0.0.10,
10.0.0.11, 10.0.0.12}. All remaining addresses are considered good.
Each leaf represents one address in the BL. Each intermediate node
represents the longest common prefix p covering all bad addresses
in that subtree. At each intermediate node p, we also show the
collateral damage (i.e., number of good addresses blocked) when we
filter prefix p instead of filtering each of its children. E.g., if we use
two filters to block bad addresses 10.0.0.5/32 and 10.0.0.7/32 the
collateral damage is 0; if, instead, we use one filter to block prefix
10.0.0.4/30, we also block good address 10.0.0.6/4, i.e., we cause
collateral damage 1.
Complexity: Given a list of addresses A, we can build
the LCP-tree(A) by performing |A| insertions in a Patricia
trie [12]. To insert a string of m bits, we need at most m
comparisons. Thus, the worst-case complexity is O(m|A|),
where m = 32 (bits) is the length of a 32-bit IPv4 address.
B. BLOCK-ALL
Problem Statement: Given: a blacklist BL, a whitelist WL,
and the number of available filters Fmax; select filters that
block all bad traffic and minimize collateral damage.
Formulation: We formulate this problem by making two
adjustments to the general framework of Eq. (1)–(4). First,
Eq. (1) becomes Eq. (5) below, which expresses the goal to
minimize the collateral damage. Second, Eq. (3) becomes Eq.
(7) below, which enforces the constraint that every bad address
should be blocked by exactly one filter, as opposed to at most
one filter in Eq.(3).
min
∑
p/l
gp/lxp/l (5)
s.t.
∑
p/l
xp/l ≤ Fmax (6)
∑
p/l:ip∈p/l
xp/l = 1 ∀ip ∈ BL (7)
Characterizing an Optimal Solution: Our algorithm starts
from LCP-tree(BL) and outputs a pruned version of that LCP
tree. Hence, we start by proving that an optimal solution to
BLOCK-ALL can indeed be represented as a pruned version
of that LCP tree.
Proposition 3.1: An optimal solution to BLOCK-ALL can
be represented as a pruned subtree of LCP-tree(BL) with the
same root as LCP-tree(BL), up to Fmax leaves, and each non-
leaf node having exactly two children.
5Proof: We prove that, for each feasible solution to
BLOCK-ALL S, there exists another feasible solution S′ that
(i) can be represented as a pruned subtree of LCP-tree(BL) as
described in the proposition and (ii) whose collateral damage
is smaller or equal to S’s. This is sufficient to prove the
proposition, since an optimal solution is also a feasible one.
Any filtering solution can be represented as a pruned
subtree of the full binary tree of all IP addresses (LCP-
tree
(
{0, 1, ..., 232 − 1}
)) with the same root and leaves cor-
responding to the filtered prefixes. S is a feasible solution to
BLOCK-ALL, therefore S uses up to Fmax filters, i.e., its tree
has up to Fmax leaves. Indeed, if this was not the case, Eq. (6)
would be violated and S would not be a feasible solution.
Let us assume that the tree representing S includes a prefix
p˜ that is not in LCP-tree(BL). There are three possible cases:
1) p˜ includes no bad addresses. In this case, we can simply
remove p˜ from S’s tree (i.e., , unblock p˜).
2) Only one of p˜’s children includes bad addresses. In this
case, we can replace p˜ with the child node.
3) Both of p˜’s children contain bad addresses. In this case, p˜
is already the longest common prefix of all bad addresses
in BL ∩ p˜, thus already on the LCP-tree(BL).
Clearly, each of these operations transforms feasible solution
S, which is assumed not to be on LCP-tree(BL), into another
feasible solution S′ with smaller or equal collateral damage
but on the LCP-Tree(BL). We can repeat this process for all
prefixes that are in S’s tree but not in LCP-tree(BL), until we
create a feasible solution S′ that includes only prefixes from
LCP-tree(BL) and has smaller or equal collateral damage.
The only element missing to prove the proposition is to
show that, in the pruned LCP subtree that represents S′, each
non-leaf node has exactly two children. We show this by
contradiction: Suppose there exists a non-leaf node in our
pruned LCP subtree that has exactly one child. This can only
result from pruning out one child of a node in the LCP tree.
This means that all the bad addresses (leaves) in the subtree
of this child node remain unfiltered, which violates Eq. (7);
but this is a contradiction because S′ is a feasible solution.
Algorithm: Algorithm 1, which solves BLOCK-ALL, con-
sists of two steps. First, we build the LCP tree from the input
blacklist BL. Second, in a bottom-up fashion, we compute
zp(F ) ∀p, F , i.e., , the minimum collateral damage needed to
block all bad addresses in the subtree of prefix p using at most
F filters. Following a dynamic programming (DP) approach,
we can find the optimal allocation of filters in the subtree
rooted at prefix p, by finding a value n and assigning F − n
filters to the left subtree and n to the right subtree, so as to
minimize collateral damage. The fact that BLOCK-ALL needs
to filter all bad addresses (leaves in the LCP tree) implies that
at least one filter must be assigned to the left and right subtree,
i.e., n = 1, 2, ..., F−1. In other words, for every pair of sibling
nodes, sl (left) and sr (right), with common parent node p,
the following recursive equation holds:
zp(F ) = min
n=1,...,F−1
{
zsl(F − n) + zsr(n)
}
, F > 1 (8)
Algorithm 1 Algorithm forsolving BLOCK-ALL
1: build LCP-tree(BL)
2: for all leaf nodes leaf do
3: zleaf (F ) = 0 ∀F ∈ [1, Fmax]
4: Xleaf (F ) = {leaf} ∀F ∈ [1, Fmax]
5: end for
6: level = level(leaf)-1
7: while level ≥ level(root) do
8: for all node p such that level(p) == level do
9: zp(1) = gp
10: Xp(1) = {p}
11: zp(F ) = minn=1,..F−1
{
zsl(F − n) + zsr (n)
}
∀F ∈
[2, Fmax]
12: Xp(F ) = Xsl(F − n) ∪Xsr (n)∀F ∈ [2, Fmax]
13: end for
14: level = level - 1
15: end while
16: return zroot(Fmax), Xroot(Fmax)
with boundary conditions for leaf and intermediate nodes:
zleaf (F ) = 0 ∀F ≥ 1 (9)
zp(1) = gp ∀p (10)
Once we compute zp(F ) for all prefixes in the LCP tree, we
simply read the value of the optimal solution, zroot(Fmax).
We also use auxiliary variables Xp(F ) to keep track of the
set of prefixes used in the optimal solution. In lines 4 and 10
of Algorithm 1, Xp(F ) is initialized to the single prefix used.
In line 12, after computing the new cost, the corresponding
set of prefixes is updated: Xp(F ) = Xsl(F − n) ∪Xsr (n).
Theorem 3.2: Algorithm 1 computes the optimal solution
of problem BLOCK-ALL: the prefixes that are contained in
set Xp(F ) are the optimal xp/l = 1 for Eq. (5)–(7).
Proof: Recall that, zroot(Fmax) denotes the value of the
optimal solution of BLOCK-ALL with Fmax filters (i.e., , the
minimum collateral damage), while Xroot(Fmax) denotes the
set of filters selected in the optimal solution. Let sl and sr
denote the two children nodes (prefixes) of root in the LCP-
tree(BL). Finding the optimal allocation of Fmax > 1 filters to
block all addresses contained in root (possibly all IP space), is
equivalent to finding the optimal allocation of x ≥ 1 filters to
block all addresses in sl, and y ≥ 1 prefixes for bad addresses
in sr, such that x + y = Fmax. This is because prefixes sl,
and sr jointly contain all bad addresses. Moreover, each of sl
and sr contains at least one bad address. Thus, at least one
filter must be assigned to each of them. If Fmax = 1, i.e., ,
there is only one filter available, the only feasible solution is
to select root as the prefix to filter out. The same argument
recursively applies to descendant nodes, until either we reach
a leaf node, or we have only one filter available. In these cases,
the problem is trivially solved by Eq. (9).
Complexity: The LCP-tree is a binary tree with |BL|
leaves; therefore, it has O(|BL|) intermediate nodes (prefixes).
Computing Eq. (8) for every node p and for every value
F ∈ [1, Fmax − 1] involves solving O(|BL|Fmax) sub-
problems, one for every pair (p, F ) with complexity O(Fmax).
zp(F ) in Eq. (8) requires only the optimal solution at the
sibling nodes, z(sl, F − n), z(sr, n). Thus, proceeding from
the leaves to the root, we can compute the optimal solution in
O(|BL|F 2max). In practice, the complexity is even lower, since
6we do not need to compute zp(F ) for all values F ≤ Fmax, but
only for F ≤ min{|leaves(p)|, Fmax}, where |leaves(p)| is
the number of the leaves in prefix p in the LCP tree. Moreover,
we only need to compute entries zp(F ) for every prefix p,
s.t. we cover all addresses in BL ∩ p, which may require
F ≤ Fmax for long prefixes in the LCP-tree.
Finally, we observe that the asymptotic complexity is
O(|BL|), since Fmax << N = |BL| and Fmax does not
depend on |BL| but only on the TCAM size. Thus, the
time complexity increases linearly with the number of bad
addresses |BL|. This is within a constant factor of the lowest
achievable complexity, since we need to read all |BL| bad
addresses at least once.
C. BLOCK-SOME
Problem Statement: Given a blacklist BL, a whitelist WL,
and the number of available filters Fmax, the goal is to select
filters so as to minimize the total cost of the attack.
Formulation: This is precisely the problem described by
Eq. (1)–(4), but put slightly rephrased to better compare it
with BLOCK-ALL. There are two differences from BLOCK-
ALL. First, the goal is to minimize the total cost of the attack,
which involves both collateral damage gp/l and the filtering
benefit bp/l, which is expressed by Eq. (11). Second, Eq. (13)
states that every bad address must be filtered by at most one
prefix, which means that it may or may not be filtered.
min
∑
p/l
(
gp/l − bp/l
)
xp/l (11)
s.t.
∑
p/l
xp/l ≤ Fmax (12)
∑
p/l:ip∈p/l
xp/l ≤ 1 ∀ip ∈ BL (13)
Characterizing an Optimal Solution: As with BLOCK-
ALL, our algorithm starts from LCP-tree(BL) and outputs a
pruned version of that LCP tree. The only difference is that
some bad addresses may now remain unfiltered. In the pruned
LCP subtree that represents our solution, this means that there
may exist intermediate (non-leaf) nodes with a single child.
Proposition 3.3: An optimal solution to BLOCK-SOME
can be represented as a pruned subtree of LCP-tree(BL) with:
the same root as LCP-tree(BL) and up to Fmax leaves.
Proof: In Proposition 3.1, we proved that any solution of
Eq. (5)–(6) can be reduced to a (pruned) subtree of the LCP
tree with at most Fmax leaves. Moreover, the constraint ex-
pressed by Eq. (13), which imposes the use of non-overlapping
prefixes, is automatically imposed considering the leaves of
the pruned subtree as the selected filter. This proves that any
feasible solution of BLOCK-SOME can be represented as a
pruned subtree of the LCP tree with at most Fmax leaves. And
thus, so can an optimal solution.
Algorithm: The algorithm that solves BLOCK-SOME is
similar to Algorithm 1 in that it relies on the LCP tree and
a dynamic programming (DP) approach. The main difference
is that not all bad addresses need to be filtered, hence, at
each step, we can assign n = 0 filters to the left and/or right
subtree. More specifically, whereas in line (11) of Algorithm 1
Fig. 3. Example of (i) BLOCK-ALL and (ii) TIME-VARYING
BLOCK-ALL. Consider a blacklist of 10 bad IP addresses BL =
{10.0.0.3, 10.0.0.10, 10.0.0.15, 10.0.0.17, 10.0.0.22, 10.0.0.31, 10.0.0.32,
10.0.0.33, 10.0.0.57, 10.0.0.58} The table next to each node p shows the
minimum cost zp(F ) computed by the DP algorithm for BLOCK-ALL for
F = 1, ...number of leaves in subtree. The optimal solution to BLOCK-ALL
consists of the 4 prefixes highlighted in black. When a new address, e.g.,
10.0.0.37, is added to the blacklist, a leaf node is added to the tree and
TIME-VARYING needs to update all and only the predecessor nodes
in LCP-tree(BL), indicated by the dashed lines, according to Eq. (8).
Moreover, a new node is created to denote the longest common prefix
between 10.0.0.37 and 10.0.0.32 (or 10.0.0.33). Note that all other nodes
corresponding to the longest common prefixes between 10.0.0.37 and other
addresses in BL are already in the LCP tree. The new optimal solution
consists of the 4 prefixes indicated by the dashed circles.
we had n = 1, ..., F − 1, now we have n = 0, 1, ..., F . We
can recursively compute the optimal solution as before:
zp(F ) = min
n=0,...,F
{
zsl(F − n) + zsr (n)
}
(14)
with boundary conditions
zp(0) = 0 ∀ p (15)
zp(1) = min
{
gp − bp, min
n=0,1
{
zsl(1 − n) + zsr (n)
}}
(16)
zleaf (F ) = −bleaf ∀F ≥ 1 (17)
where p is an intermediate node (prefix) and leaf is a leaf
node in the LCP-tree.
Complexity: The analysis of Algorithm 1 applies to this
algorithm as well. The complexity is the same, i.e., , linearly
increasing with |BL|.
BLOCK-ALL vs. BLOCK-SOME: There is an interesting
connection between the two problems. The latter can be
regarded as an automatic way to select the best subset from
BL and run BLOCK-ALL only on that subset. If the absolute
value of weights of bad addresses are significantly larger
than the weights of the good addresses, then BLOCK-SOME
degenerates to BLOCK-ALL.
D. TIME-VARYING BLOCK-ALL(SOME)
We now consider that the blacklist and whitelist change over
time and we seek to incrementally update the filtered prefixes
that are affected by the change. More precisely, consider a
sequence of blacklists, {BLτ0 ,BLτ1 , . . .} and of whitelists,
{WLτ0 ,WLτ1 , . . .} at times τ0, τ1, . . ., respectively.
7Problem Statement: Given: (i) a blacklist and whitelist,
BLτi−1 and WLτi−1 , (ii) the number of available filters Fmax,
(iii) the corresponding solution to BLOCK-ALL(SOME), de-
noted by Sτi−1 , and (iv) another blacklist and whitelist, BLτi
and WLτi ; obtain the solution to BLOCK-ALL(SOME) for
the second blacklist/whitelist, denoted by Sτi .
Algorithm: Consider, for the moment, that the whitelist
remains the same and focus on the changes in the blacklist.
(i) Addition. First, consider that the two blacklists differ
only in a single new bad address, which does not appear in
BLτi−1 , but appears in BLτi . There are two cases, depending
on whether the new bad address belongs to a prefix that is
already filtered in Sτi−1 . If it is, no further action is needed,
and Sτi = Sτi−1 . Otherwise, we modify the LCP tree that
represents Sτi−1 to also include the new bad address, as
illustrated in Fig. 3. The key point is that we only need to add
one new intermediate node to the LCP tree (the gray node in
Fig. 3), corresponding to the longest common prefix between
the new bad address and its closest bad address that is already
in the LCP tree. The optimal allocation of F filters to the
subtree rooted at prefix p depends only on how these F filters
are allocated to the children of p. Hence, when we add a new
node to the LCP tree, we need to recompute the optimal filter
allocation (i.e., recompute zp(F ) and Xp(F ) ∀F , according
to Eq. (8)) for all and only the predecessors of the new node,
all the way up to the root node.
(ii) Deletion. Then assume that two blacklists differ in one
deleted bad address, which appears in BLτi−1 but not in BLτi .
In this case, we modify the LCP tree that represents Sτi−1
to we remove the leaf node that corresponds to that address
as well as its parent node (since that node does not have
two children any more), and we recompute the optimal filter
allocation for all and only the node’s predecessors.
(iii) Adjustment. Finally, suppose that the two blacklists
differ in one address, which appears in both blacklists but with
different weights; or, that the two blacklists are the same, while
the two whitelists differ in one address (it either appears in
one of the two whitelists or it appears in both whitelists but
with different weights). In all of these cases, we do not need to
add or remove any nodes from the LCP tree, but we do need
to adjust the collateral damage or filtering benefit associated
with one node, hence recompute the optimal filter allocation
for all and only that node’s predecessors.
(iv) Multiple addresses. If the two successive time instances
differ in multiple addresses, we repeat the procedures de-
scribed above as needed, i.e., we perform one node addition
for each new bad address, one deletion for each removed bad
address, and up to one adjustment for each other difference.
Complexity: Since the LCP tree is a complete binary
tree, any leaf node has at most log(|BL|) predecessors,
so, inserting a new bad address (or removing one) re-
quires O(log(|BL|)F 2max) operations. Hence, deriving Sτi
from Sτi−1 as described above is asymptotically better than
computing it from scratch using Algorithm 1. if and only if the
number of different addresses between the two time instances
is less than |BL|log |BL| .
E. FLOODING
Problem Statement: Given: (i) a blacklist BL and a whitelist
WL, where the absolute weight of each bad and good address
is equal to the amount of traffic it generates, (ii) the number
of available filters Fmax, and (iii) a constraint on the victim’s
link capacity (bandwidth) C; select filters so as to minimize
collateral damage and make the total traffic fit within the
victim’s link capacity.
Formulation: To formulate this problem, we need to make
two adjustments to the general framework of Eq. (1)–(4).
First, Eq. (1) becomes Eq. (18), which expresses the goal
to minimize collateral damage. Second, we add a new con-
straint Eq. (20), which specifies that the total traffic that
remains unblocked after filtering (which is the total traffic,
T0 =
∑
ip∈BL∪WLwip, minus the traffic that gets blocked,∑
p/l
(
gp/l + bp/l
)
xp/l should fit within the link capacity C,
so as to avoid congestion and packet loss.
min
∑
p/l
gp/lxp/l (18)
s.t.
∑
p/l
xp/l ≤ Fmax (19)
T0 −
∑
p/l
(
gp/l + bp/l
)
xp/l ≤ C (20)
∑
p/l:ip∈p/l
xp/l ≤ 1 ∀ip ∈ BL (21)
Characterizing an Optimal Solution: We represent the opti-
mal solution as a pruned subtree of an LCP-tree. However, we
start with the full binary tree of all bad and good addresses
LCP-tree(BL ∪ WL). Moreover, to handle the constraint in
Eq. (20), each node corresponding to prefix p is assigned an
additional cost, Tp, indicating the total amount of traffic sent
by p, Tp = gp + bp.
Proposition 3.4: An optimal solution of FLOODING can
be represented as the leaves of a pruned subtree of LCP-
tree(BL ∪WL), with the same root, up to Fmax leaves, and
total cost of the leaves ≥ T0 − C.
Proof: Similarly to Proposition 3.1, we prove that for
every feasible solution to FLOODING S, there exists another
feasible solution S′, which (i) can be represented as a pruned
subtree of LCP-tree(BL∪WL) as described in the proposition
and (ii) whose collateral damage is smaller or equal to S’s.
This is sufficient to prove the proposition, since an optimal
solution is also a feasible one.
Any filtering solution can be represented as a pruned subtree
of LCP-tree
(
{0, 1, ..., 232 − 1}
)
with the same root and leaves
corresponding to the filtered prefixes. S is a feasible solution
to FLOODING, therefore: S’s tree has up to Fmax leaves,
otherwise Eq. (19) would be violated; and the total cost of
S’s leaves is ≥ T0−C, otherwise Eq. (20) would be violated.
Suppose that S includes a prefix p˜ that is not in LCP-
tree(BL ∪ WL). We can construct a better feasible solution
S′, which can be represented as a pruned subtree of LCP-
tree(BL∪WL): S′ has the same root, up to Fmax leaves and
total cost of the leaves ≥ T0−C. There are three possibilities:
1) p˜ includes neither bad nor good addresses. In this case,
we can simply remove p˜ from S, i.e., unblock p˜.
82) Only one of p˜’s children includes bad or good addresses.
In this case, we can replace p˜ with the child that contains
the bad addresses.
3) Both of p˜’s children include bad or good addresses. In
this case, p˜ is already a longest common prefix and we
do not need to do anything.
Clearly, each of these operations transforms feasible solution
S into another feasible solution with smaller or equal collateral
damage while still preserving the capacity constraint. This is
because the transformations filter the same amount of traffic,
just using the longest prefix possible to do so. We can repeat
this process for all prefixes that are in S but not in LCP-
tree(BL ∪ WL), until we create a feasible solution S′ that
includes only prefixes from LCP-tree(BL ∪ WL) and has
smaller or equal collateral damage.
Theorem 3.5: FLOODING (i.e., Eq.(18)-(21)) is NP-Hard.
Proof: To prove that FLOODING is NP-hard, we con-
sider the knapsack problem with a cardinality constraint:
max
∑
i∈N
pixi (22)
∑
i∈N
xi = k (23)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
wixi ≤ C1 (24)
which is known to be NP-hard [11] and we show that it
reduces to FLOODING. To do this, we put FLOODING in a
slightly different form, by making two changes.
First, we change the inequality in Eq. (19) to an equality.
Any feasible solution to FLOODING that uses F < Fmax
filters can be transformed to another feasible solution with
exactly Fmax filters, without increasing collateral damage. In
fact, given a feasible solution S that uses F < Fmax filters,
as long as F < |BL|, it is always possible to remove a
filter from a prefix p and add two filters to the two prefixes
corresponding to p’s children in LCP-tree(BL ∪ WL). The
solution constructed this way uses F + 1 filters, blocks all
addresses blocked in S, and has a cost less or equal to S’s.
Second, we define variables x¯p/l = −xp/l, F¯max = −Fmax
and C¯ = T0 − C and use them to rewrite FLOODING:
max
∑
p/l
gp/lx¯p/l (25)
s.t.
∑
p/l
x¯p/l = F¯max, (26)
∑
p/l
(
gp/l + bp/l
)
x¯p/l ≤ C¯ (27)
∑
p/l:ip∈p/l
−x¯p/l ≤ −1 ∀ip ∈ BL (28)
For a given instance of the problem defined by Eq. (22)-(23),
we construct an equivalent instance of the problem defined
by Eq. (25)-(28) by introducing the following mapping. For
ip ∈ BL ∪ WL: gip = pi, (gip + bip) = wi. For all other
prefixes p/l that are not addresses in the blacklist or whitelist:
(gp/l + bp/l) = C¯ + 1. Moreover, we assign F¯max = k and
C¯ = C1. With this assignment, a solution to the problem
defined by Eq. (22) can be obtained by solving FLOODING,
then taking the values of variables xp/l that are blocked.
Algorithm: Given the hardness of the problem, we do not
look for a polynomial-time algorithm. We design a pseudo-
polynomial-time algorithm that optimally solves FLOODING,
Its complexity is linearly with the number of good and bad
addresses and with the magnitude of Cmax.
Our algorithm is similar to the one that solves BLOCK-
SOME, i.e., , it relies on an LCP tree and a DP approach.
However, we now use the LCP tree of all the bad and good
addresses. Moreover, when we compute the optimal filter
allocation for each subtree, we now need to consider not only
the number of filters allocated to that subtree, but also the
corresponding amount of capacity (i.e., , the amount of the
victim’s capacity consumed by the unfiltered traffic coming
from the corresponding prefix). We can recursively compute
the optimal solution bottom-up as before:
zp(F, c) = min
n=0,...,F
m=0,...,c
{zsl(F − n, c−m) + zsr (n,m)} (29)
where zp(F, c) is the minimum collateral of prefix p when
allocating F filters and capacity c to that prefix.
Complexity: Our DP approach computes O(CFmax) en-
tries for every node in LCP-tree(BL ∪ WL). Moreover,
the computation of a single entry, given the entries of de-
scendant nodes, require O(CFmax) operations, Eq.(29). We
can leverage again the observation that we do not need
to compute CFmax entries for all nodes in the LCP tree:
At a node p, it is sufficient to compute Eq.(29) only for
c = 0, ..., C˜ = min{C,
∑
ip∈p/l wip} ≤ C and f =
0, ..., F = max{Fmax, |leaves(p)|}. Therefore, the optimal
solution to FLOODING, zroot(Fmax, C), can be computed in
O((|BL|+|WL|)C2) time. This is increasing linearly with the
number of addresses in BL∪WL and is polynomial in C. The
overall complexity is pseudo-polynomial because C cannot
be polynomially bounded in the input size. In the evaluation
section, we present a heuristic algorithm that operates in
increments ∆C of C. Finally, we note that Fmax << C and
thus Fmax does not appear in the asymptotic complexity.
BLOCK-SOME vs. FLOODING: There is an interesting
connection between the two problems. To see that, consider
the partial Lagrangian relaxation of Eq. (18)–(21):
max
λ≥0
{
min
∑
p/l
[
(1 − λ)gp/l − λbp/l
]
xp/l+ (30)
+
∑
p/l
λT0 − λC
}
s.t.
∑
p/l
xp/l ≤ Fmax (31)
∑
p/l:ip∈p/l
xp/l ≤ 1 ∀ ip ∈ BL (32)
For every fixed λ ≥ 0, Eq. (30)–(32) are equivalent to Eq.
(11)–(13) for a specific assignments of weights wip. This
shows that dual feasible solutions of FLOODING are instances
of BLOCK-SOME for a particular assignment of weights. The
dual problem, in the variable λ, aims exactly at tuning the
Lagrangian multiplier to find the best assignment of weights.
9F. DISTRIBUTED-FLOODING
Problem Statement: Consider a victim V that connects to
the Internet through its ISP and is flooded by a set of attackers
listed in a blacklist BL, as in Fig.1(a). To reach the victim,
attack traffic passed through one or more ISP routers. Let R
be the set of unique such routers. Let each router u ∈ R
have capacity C(u) on the downstream link (towards V ) and
a limited number of filters F (u)max. The volume of good/bad
traffic through every router is assumed known. Our goal is to
allocate filters on some or all routers, in a distributed way, so as
to minimize the total collateral damage and avoid congestion
on all links of the ISP network.
Formulation. Let the variables x(u)p/l ∈ {0, 1} indicate
whether or not filter p/l is used at router u. Then the
distributed filtering problem can be stated as:
min
∑
u∈R
∑
p/l
g
(u)
p/lx
(u)
p/l (33)
s.t.
∑
p/l
x
(u)
p/l ≤ F
(u)
max ∀u ∈ R (34)
T
(u)
0 −
∑
p/l
(
g
(u)
p/l + b
(u)
p/l
)
x
(u)
p/l ≤ C
(u) ∀u ∈ R (35)
∑
u∈R
∑
p/l∋ip
x
(u)
p/l ≤ 1 ∀ip ∈ BL (36)
Characterizing an Optimal Solution. Given the sets BL,
WL, R, and F (u)max, C(u) at each router, we have:
Proposition 3.6: There exists an optimal solution of DIST-
FLOODING that can be represented as a set of |R| different
pruned subtrees of the LCP-tree(BL∪WL), each correspond-
ing to a feasible solution of FLOODING for the same input,
and s.t. every subtree leaf is not a node of another subtree.
Proof. Feasible solutions of DIST-FLOODING allocate fil-
ters on different routers s.t. Eq.(34) and (35) are satisfied
independently at every router. In the LCP tree, this means
having |R| subtrees, one for every router, each having at most
F
(u)
max leaves and associated blocked traffic ≥ T (u)0 − C(u),
where T (u)0 is the total incoming traffic at router u. Each
subtree can be thought as a feasible solution of a FLOODING
problem. Eq.(36) ensures that the same address is not filtered
multiple times at different routers, to avoid waste of filters. In
the LCP-tree, this translates into every leaf appearing at most
in one subtree. 
Algorithm. Constraint (36), which imposes that different
routers do not block the same prefixes, prevents us from a
direct decomposition of the problem. To decouple the problem,
consider the following partial Lagrangian relaxation:
L(x, λ) =
∑
u∈R
∑
p/l
g
(u)
p/lx
(u)
p/l +
∑
ip∈BL
λip
(∑
u∈R
∑
p/l∋ip
x
(u)
p/l − 1
)
=
∑
u∈R
(∑
p/l
(
g
(u)
p/l + λp/l
)
x
(u)
p/l
)
−
∑
ip∈BL
λip (37)
where λip is the Lagrangian multiplier (price) for the con-
straint in Eq.(36), and λp/l =
∑
ip∈p/l λip is the price asso-
ciated with prefix p/l. With this relaxation, both the objective
function and the other constraints immediately decompose in
|R| independent sub-problems, one per router u:
min
∑
p/l
(
g
(u)
p/l + λp/l
)
x
(u)
p/l (38)
s.t.
∑
p/l
x
(u)
p/l ≤ F
(u)
max (39)
T
(u)
0 −
∑
p/l
(
g
(u)
p/l + b
(u)
p/l
)
x
(u)
p/l ≤ C
(u) (40)
The dual problem is:
max
λip≥0
∑
u∈R
hu(λ) −
∑
ip∈BL
λip (41)
where hu(λ) is the optimal solution of (38)-(40) for a given
λ. Given the prices λip, every sub-problem (38)-(40) can be
solved independently and optimally by router u using e.g.,
Eq. (29). Problem (41) can be solved using a projected sub-
gradient method [11]. In particular, we use the following
update rule to compute shadow prices at each iteration:
λ
(k+1)
ip = λ
(k)
ip + α(
∑
u
∑
p/l∋ ip
x
(u)
p/l − 1)
where α is the step size. The interpretation of the update rule
is quite intuitive: for every ip that is filtered with multiple
filters the corresponding shadow price, λip, is augmented
proportionally to the number of times it is blocked. Increasing
the prices has in turn the effect of forcing the router to try to
unblock the corresponding ip. The price is increased until a
single filter is used to block that ip.
Note, however, that since x is an integer variable, x ∈
{0, 1}, the dual problem is not always guaranteed to converge
to a primal feasible solution [13].
Distributed vs. Centralized Solution. The above formulation
lends itself naturally to a distributed implementation. Each
router needs to solve only their own sub-problem (38)-(40)
independently from others. A single machine (e.g., the victim’s
gateway or a dedicated node) should solve the master problem
(41) to iteratively find the prices that coordinate all sub-
problems. At every iteration of the sub-gradient, the new λip’s
need to be broadcasted to all routers. Given the λip’s, the
routes solve independently a sub-problem each and return the
computed x(u)p/l to the node in charge of the master problem.
Even in a centralized setting, our scheme lends itself to parallel
computation of Eq.(33)-(36).
IV. PRACTICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our algorithms using real logs
from malicious traffic. We demonstrate that our algorithms
bring significant benefit compared to non-optimized filter
selection or to generic clustering algorithms, in a wide range
of scenarios. The reason behind this benefit is the well-
known fact that sources of malicious traffic exhibit spatial
and temporal clustering [3]–[9], which is exploited by our
algorithms. Indeed, clustering in a blacklist allows to use a
small number of filters to block prefixes with high density
of malicious IPs at low collateral damage. Furthermore, it
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Fig. 4. Evaluation of BLOCK-ALL in Scenarios I and II in terms of
collateral damage (CD) (normalized over the number of malicious sources
N ) vs. number of filters Fmax. We compare Algorithm 1 to K-means.
In particular, we simulated 50 runs of Lloyd’s heuristic to solve the K-
means problem in order to avoid local minima. We also run Algorithm 1
on two traces, those with the highest and lowest degree of clustering. “High
clustering” and “Low clustering” refers to the two example blacklists in
Scenarios I and II, respectively.
has also been observed that the good and bad addresses
are typically not co-located, which allows for distinguishing
between good and bad traffic [6], [7], [14], and in our case
for efficient filtering of the most “contaminated” prefixes.
A. Simulation Setup
We used 61-day logs from Dshield.org [10] - a
repository of firewall and intrusion detection logs collected.
The dataset consists of 758,698,491 attack reports, from
32,950,391 different IP sources belonging to about 600 con-
tributing organizations. Each report includes a timestamp, the
contributor ID, and the information for the flow that raised the
alarm, including the (malicious) source IP and the (victim)
destination IP. Looking at the attack sources in the logs,
we verified that malicious sources are clustered in a few
prefixes, rather than uniformly distributed over the IP space,
consistently with what was observed before e.g., in [3]–[7].
In our simulations, we considered a blacklist to be the set
of sources attacking a particular organization (victim) during a
day-period. The degree of clustering varied significantly in the
blacklists of different victims and across different days. The
higher the clustering, the more the benefit we expect from
our approach. We also simulated the whitelist, by generating
good IP addresses according to the multifractal distribution in
[15] on routable prefixes. We performed the simulations on a
linux-machine with 2.4 GHz processor with 2 GB RAM.
B. Simulation of BLOCK-ALL and BLOCK-SOME
Simulation Scenarios I & II. In Fig. 4, we considered two
example blacklists corresponding to two different victims, each
attacked by a large number (up to 100,000) of malicious IPs
in a single day. We picked to present the blacklists with the
highest and the lowest degree of source clustering observed in
the entire dataset these two in particular, referred to as “High
Clustering” (I) and “Low Clustering” (II), respectively; these
demonstrate the range of benefit from our approach.
BLOCK-ALL. We ran Algorithm 1 in these two scenarios
and we show the results in Fig.4. We made the following
observations. First, the optimal algorithm performs signifi-
cantly better than a generic clustering algorithm that does not
100 101 102 103 104 105
0
2
4
x 10−3
CD
/N
 
 
Low W
High W
100 101 102 103 104 105
0
0.5
1
# 
un
filt
er
ed
 b
ad
 IP
s/
N
 
 
Low W
High W
100 101 102 103 104 105
−2
−1
0
x 109
To
t. 
Co
st
Fmax
 
 
Low W
High W
Fig. 5. Evaluation of BLOCK-SOME for Scenario II (Low Clustering
blacklist). Three metrics are considered: (a) Collateral damage (CD) (b)
Number of unfiltered bad IPs (UBIP) (c) Total cost CD + W · UBIP .
The operator expresses preference for UBIP vs. CD by tuning the weight
W = wb
wg
. We considered two values of W : a higher (214) and a lower (210)
one.
exploit the structure of IP prefixes. In particular, it reduces the
collateral damage (CD) by up to 85% compared to K-means,
when run on the same (high-clustering) blacklist. Second,
the degree of clustering in a blacklist matters: the CD is
lowest (highest) in the blacklist with highest (lowest) degree of
clustering, respectively. Results obtained for different victims
and days were similar and lied in between the two extremes. A
few thousands of filters were sufficient to significantly reduce
collateral damage in all cases.
BLOCK-SOME. In Fig. 5, we focus on Scenario II, i.e.,
the Low Clustering blacklist and thus the highest CD (dashed
line in Fig.4), which is the least favorable input for our
algorithm. Unlike BLOCK-ALL, BLOCK-SOME allows the
operator to trade-off lower CD for some unfiltered bad IPs
by appropriately tuning the weights. For simplicity, in Fig.
5, we assigned the same weights wg and wb to all good
and bad sources; however, the framework has the flexibility
to assign different weights to different IPs. In Fig. 5(a), the
CD is always smaller than the corresponding CD in Fig. 4;
they become equal only when we block all bad IPs. In Fig.
5(b), we observe that BLOCK-SOME reduces the CD by 60%
compared to BLOCK-ALL while leaving unfiltered only 10%
of bad IPs and using only a few hundreds a filters.
In Fig. 5(c), the total cost of the attack (i.e., the weighted
sum of bad and good traffic blocked) decreases as Fmax
increases. The interaction between these two competing factors
is complex and strongly depends on the input blacklist and
whitelist. In the data we analyzed, we observed that CD
tends to first increase and then decrease with Fmax, while
the number of unfiltered bad IPs tends to decrease The ratio
wb/wg captures the effort2 made by BLOCK-SOME to block
all bad IPs and become similar to BLOCK-ALL.
C. Simulation of FLOODING and DIST-FLOODING
Simulation Scenario III. We consider a web server under
2Since we picked a ratio wb/wg > 1, bad IPs are more important. When
Fmax is high, the algorithm first tries to cover small clusters or single bad
IPs. In the case of high W , this happens around 10, 000 filters. CD remains
almost constant in this phase, at the end of which all bad IPs are filtered (as
in Fig.5(b)). In the final phase, the algorithm releases single good IPs, which
are less important and all bad IPs are blocked similarly to BLOCK-ALL.
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Fig. 6. Optimal Solution of FLOODING in Scenario III. In (a), we show the normalized collateral damage, CD/N , as a function of the number of
available filters, Fmax, when C is fixed, C = Cmax. In (b), we show CD/N as a function of the available capacity, Cmax, when F is fixed, F = Fmax.
In (c), we show how the ratio CD/N varies as a function of both Cmax and Fmax.
a DDOS attack. We assume that the server has a typical
access bandwidth of C = 100 Mbps and can handle 10,000
connections per second (a typical capability of a web server
that handles light content). We assume that each good (bad)
source generates the same amount of good (bad) traffic.
We also assume that Fmax = 12, 000 filters are available
(consistently with the discussion in footnote 1) and we vary
F = 1, ...Fmax. Before the attack, 5, 000 good sources are
picked from [15] and utilize 10% of the capacity. During the
attack, the total bad traffic is 10C = 1Gbps and is generated
by a typical blacklist (141,763 bad source IPs), based on
Dshield logs of a randomly chosen victim for a randomly
chosen day.3
FLOODING - Optimal. Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b) show the
collateral damage of the optimal solution of FLOODING,
for Scenario III, as a function of the number of available
filters Fmax, and as a function of the bottleneck capacity C,
respectively. As baseline for comparison, we simulate uniform
rate-limiting, which drops the same fraction of all incoming
connections and is a common practice in DDOS attacks. Since
bad sources outnumber the good sources in a typical DDOS
attack, uniform rate-limiting penalizes disproportionally the
good sources. While this solution is always applicable and
requires only one rate limiter, more filters can drastically
reduce the collateral damage.
We also observe that varying the number of filters or the
available capacity has a different impact on the collateral
damage. While the collateral damage decreases exponentially
as the number of filters increases, when we increase the
available capacity we observe two trends. First, as capacity
increases, the optimal solution allows traffic from good sources
that do not belong in prefixes with many malicious sources.
This causes a linear decrease with slope equal to the amount of
traffic generated by good sources. For even larger C, good IPs
located in the same prefix as malicious sources are released.
This trend depends on the specific clustering of good and bad
IPs considered as well as on the amount of traffic generated by
3However, because this problem is NP-hard we do not simulate the entire IP
space, but the range [60.0.0.0, 90.0.0.0], which is known to account for the
largest amount of malicious traffic, e.g., see [6]. We also scale all parameters
by a factor of 8, Fmax, Cmax, wi to maintain a constant ratio between the
number of IPs and Fmax, and, the total flow generated and Cmax .
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Fig. 7. Heuristic solution of FLOODING in Scenario IV. An approx-
imate solution (higher CD) is obtained by solving only the sub-problems
zp(f, n∆C) for n ∈ N and C = n∆C ≤ Cmax, n = 1, 2.... The
coarser the capacity increments ∆C, the fewer sub-problems we need to
solve, but at the cost of higher collateral damage. In this scenario, increasing
∆C significantly reduces the computational time by 3 orders of magnitude,
while the percentage of good traffic that is blocked (CD %) is only increased
by a factor 3.
both good and bad sources. In Fig. 6(c) we plot the collateral
damage as a function of both the number of available filters
and the available capacity. When the value of F (C) is too
low, increasing C (F ) does not yield any benefit. Most of the
improvement is obtained when both resources increase.
FLOODING - Heuristic. The benefit of the optimal solution
of FLOODING comes at high computational cost, due to the
intrinsic hardness of the FLOODING problem. To address this
issue, we design a heuristic for solving FLOODING, which
can be tuned to achieve the desired tradeoff between collateral
damage and computational time. In particular, instead of
solving all subproblems, zp(f, c), for all possible values of
f ≤ Fmax and c ≤ Cmax, we consider discrete increments of
capacity c = n∆C, with step size ∆C. If ∆C = min{wip},
the finest granularity of c is considered, and the problem is
optimally solved. If ∆C > min{wip} we may get a sub-
optimal solution, but we reduce the computation cost, as fewer
iterations are required to solve the DP.
Simulation Scenario IV. We consider again a DDOS attack
launched by 61,229 different bad source IPs, based on the
Dshield.org logs. The available capacity, C = 100 Mbps.
Before the attack, the legitimate traffic consumes 12C =
50Mbps. During the attack, the total bad traffic generated
is 100C = 10Gbps. This scenario is more challenging than
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Fig. 8. Distributed Flooding. This topology exemplifies the part of a
potentially larger ISP topology involved in routing and blocking traffic towards
victim V . The edge routers receive all incoming, malicious and legitimate,
traffic towards victim V and route it through shortest-paths with ties broken
randomly. Any of the traversed routers (indicated with circles) can be used
to deploy ACLs and block the malicious traffic.
scenario III, because there is less unused capacity before the
attack, and more malicious traffic during the flooding attack.
In Fig. 7, we show the percentage of good traffic that is
blocked by the heuristic vs. the time required to obtain a
solution, for scenario IV. As we can see in Fig. 7, the optimal
solution of FLOODING (∆C = 1) requires about 1 day of
computation and has CD that is only 6% of the total good
traffic. Larger values of ∆C allows to dramatically reduce the
computational time by about 3 orders of magnitude while the
CD is only increased by a factor 2-3. This asymmetry was
also the case in other Dshield logs we simulated. This can
be very useful in practice: an operator may decide to use an
approximation of the optimal filtering policy to immediately
cope with incoming bad traffic, and then successively refine
the allocation of filters to further reduce the collateral damage
if the attack persists.
DISTRIBUTED-FLOODING. We simulated the scenario
where an ISP utilizes multiple routers to collaboratively block
malicious traffic. We consider the same scenario (III) as for the
optimal flooding for a single router, but now we assume that
the traffic reaches the victim routed over the example topology
illustrated in Fig.8.
We use a sub-gradient descent method to solve the dual
problem in Eq.(41). In Fig.9, we show the convergence of
the method for two different step sizes: 0.05 and 0.01. We
also compare against the “no coordination” case, when routers
do not coordinate but act independently to block malicious
traffic; this corresponds to the first iteration of the sub-gradient
method. In the next iterations, routers coordinate, through the
exchange of shadow prices λ, and avoid the redundant overlap
of prefixes at multiple locations. This reduces the collateral
damage significantly, i.e., by ∼ 50%.
V. OUR WORK IN PERSPECTIVE
Bigger Picture and Assumptions. Dealing with malicious
traffic is a hard problem that requires the cooperation of several
components, including detection and mitigation techniques, as
well as architectural aspects. In this paper, we do not propose
a novel solution. Instead, we optimize the use of filtering - a
mechanism that already exists on the Internet today and is a
necessary building block of any bigger solution. We focus on
the optimal construction of filtering rules, which can be then
installed and propagated by filtering protocols [16], [17].
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Fig. 9. Evaluation of DIST-FLOODING in Scenario III. Results are
shown for the distributed algorithm and two different values for the step size
(0.01 and 0.05) of the subgradient method. The dashed line shows the case
of “No Coordination”, i.e., when each router acts independently.
We rely on an intrusion detection system or on historical
data, to distinguish good from bad traffic and to provide us
with a blacklist. Detection of malicious traffic is an important
problem but out of the scope of this paper. The sources of
legitimate traffic are also assumed known and used for assess-
ing the collateral damage; e.g., web servers or ISPs typically
keep historical data and know their important customers.
We also consider addresses in the blacklist to not be
spoofed. This is reasonable today that attackers use botnets,
and control a huge number of infected hosts for a short period
of time, so that they do not even need to use spoofing. On
2005, less than 20% of addresses were spoofable [18], while
in 2008, only 7% of addresses in Dshield logs were found
likely spoofed [4]. Even if there is some amount of spoofed
traffic, our algorithms treat it as the rest of malicious traffic
and weight the cost vs. the benefit of blocking a source prefix
(which may include both malicious spoofed and legitimate
traffic). Looking into the future, there is also a number of
proposals promising to enforce source accountability, includ-
ing ingress filtering [19], self-certifying addresses [20], packet
passports [21]. To the extent that spoofing interferes with the
ability to define blacklists, our algorithms work best together
with an anti-spoofing mechanism, but also do the best that can
be done today without it.
Deployment scenario. A practical deployment scenario
is that of a single network under the same administrative
authority, such as an ISP or a campus network. The operator
can use our algorithms to install filters at a single edge router
or at several routers, in order to optimize the use of its
resources and to defend against an attack in a cost-efficient
way. Our distributed algorithm may also be useful, not only
for a routers within the same ISP, but also, in the future, when
different ISPs start cooperating against common enemies.
ACLs vs. firewall rules. Our algorithms may also be
applicable in a different context: to configure firewall rules to
protect public-access networks, such as university campus net-
works or web-hosting networks. Unlike routers where TCAM
puts a hard limit on the number of ACLs, there is no hard
limit on the number of firewall rules, in software; however,
there is still an incentive to minimize their number and thus
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any associated performance penalty [22].
There is a body of work on firewall rule management and
(mis)configuration [23], which aims at detecting anomalies
such as the existence of multiple firewall rules that match
the same packet, or the existence of a rule that will never
match packets flowing through a specific firewall. In contrast,
we focus on resource allocation: given a blacklist and a
whitelist as input to the problem, our goal is to optimally
select which prefixes to filter so as to optimize an appropriate
objective subject to the constraints. Furthermore, the work in
[23] considers firewalls for enterprises, which are not supposed
to be accessed from outside and thus can be protected without
filtering rules.
Measurement studies. Several measurement studies have
demonstrated that malicious sources exhibit spatial and tem-
poral clustering [3]–[7], [9]. In order to deal with dynamic
malicious IP addresses [8], IP prefixes rather than individ-
ual IP addresses are typically considered. The clustering, in
combination with the fact that the distribution of addresses
as well as other statistical characteristics differ for good and
bad traffic, have been exploited in the past for detection and
mitigation of malicious traffic, such as e.g., spam [6], [7] or
DDoS [14]. In this work, we exploit these characteristics for
efficient prefix-based filtering of malicious traffic.
Prefix Selection. The work in [14] studied source prefix
filtering for classification and blocking of DDoS traffic, which
is closely related to our FLOODING problem. The selection
of prefixes in [14] was done heuristically, thus leading to large
collateral damage was incurred. In contrast, we tackle analyt-
ically the optimal source prefix selection so as to minimize
collateral damage. Furthermore, we provide a more general
framework for formulating and optimally solving a family of
related problems, including but not limited to FLOODING.
The work in [24], is related to our TIME-VARYING
problem: it designed and analyzed an online learning algo-
rithm for tracking malicious IP prefixes based on a stream
of labeled data. The goal was detection, i.e., classifying a
prefix as malicious, depending on the ratio of malicious and
legitimate traffic it generates, and subject to a constraint on the
number of prefixes. In contrast: (i) we identify precisely (not
approximately) the IP prefixes with the highest concentration
of malicious traffic; (ii) we follow a different formulation
(dynamic programming inspired by knapsack problems); (iii)
we use the results of detection as input to our filtering problem.
An earlier body of literature focused on identifying IP
prefixes with significant amount of network traffic, typically
referred to as hierarchical heavy hitters: [25]–[27]. However,
it did not consider the interaction between legitimate the
malicious traffic within the same prefix, which is the core
tradeoff studied in this paper.
Relation to Knapsack Problems. Filter selection belongs
to the family of multidimensional knapsack problems (dKP)
[11]. The general dKP problem is well-known to be NP-hard.
The most relevant variation is the knapsack with cardinality
constraint (1.5KP) [28], [29], which has d = 2 constraints, one
of them being a limit on the number of items:
∑
j∈N wjxj ≤
C,
∑
j∈N xj ≤ k. The 1.5KP problem is also NP-hard.
These classic problems do not consider correlation between
items. However, in filtering, the selection of an item (prefix)
voids the possibility to select other items (all overlapping
prefixes). dKP problems with correlation between items have
been studied in [30], [31], where the items were partitioned
into classes and up to one item per class was picked. In our
case, a class is the set of all prefixes covering a certain address.
Each item (prefix) can belong simultaneously to any number of
classes, from one class (/32 address) to all classes (/0 prefix).
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to tackle a case
where the classes are not a partition of the set of items.
A continuous relaxation does not help either. Allowing xp/l
to be fractional corresponds to rate-limiting of prefix p/l. This
has no advantage neither from a practical (rate limiters are
more expensive than ACLs, because in addition to looking
up packets in TCAM, they also require rate and computation
on the fast path) nor from a theoretical point of view (the
continuous 1.5KP is still NP-hard [32].)
In summary, the special structure of the prefix filtering
problem, i.e., the hierarchy and overlap of candidate prefixes,
leads to novel variations of dKP that could not be solved by
directly applying existing methods in the KP literature.
Our prior work. This journal paper builds on our confer-
ence paper in [33]. Compared to [33], new contributions in
this paper include: the formulation and optimal solution of
the time-varying version of the filtering problem; an extended
evaluation section, which simulates all filtering problems
over Dshield.org logs, including FLOODING and DIST-
FLOODING which were not evaluated in [33]; and additional
proofs, complexity analysis and comments that were not in
[33].
Earlier on, in a related workshop paper [34], we also
studied optimal range-based filtering, where malicious source
addresses were aggregated into continuous ranges (of numbers
in the IP address space [0, 232 − 1]), instead of prefixes.
This was an easier problem that allowed for greedy solutions.
Unfortunately, ranges are not implementable in ACLs; fur-
thermore, it is well-known that ranges cannot be efficiently
approximated by a combination of prefixes [12]. Therefore,
despite the intuition we gained in [34], we had to solve the
problem of prefix-based filtering from scratch in this paper.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce a formal framework for optimal
source prefix-based filtering. The framework is rooted at
the theory of the knapsack problem and provides a novel
extension to it. Within it, we formulate five practical problems,
presented in increasing order of complexity. For each problem,
we designed optimal algorithms that are also low-complexity
(linear or pseudo-polynomial in the input size). We simulate
our algorithms over Dshield.org logs and demonstrate that
they bring significant benefit compared to non-optimized filter
selection or to generic clustering algorithms. A key insight
behind that benefit is that our algorithms exploit the spatial and
temporal clustering exhibited by sources of malicious traffic.
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